Exchange rate volatility and trade: a general equilibrium analysis. by Sercu, Piet & Uppal, R
OEPARTEMENT TOEGEPASTE 
ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR  9607 
Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis 
by 
Piet SERCU 
Raman  UPPAL 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69,  8-3000  Leuven ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR  9607 
Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade: 
011996/237617 
A General Equilibrium Analysis 
by 
Piet SERCU 
Raman  UPPAL Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis 
Piet Sercu 
Department of Applied Economics 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven 
Belgium 




Faculty of Commerce and Business Adm. 
University of British Columbia 
2053 Main Mall, Vancouver B.C. 
Canada, V6T 1Z2 





In this paper, we use insights from the literature on financial options to analyze the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on the volume of trade between countries. In contrast to  existing 
work,  this  analysis  is  carried out in a  model  where  the exchange rate is  determined 
endogenously, and the volatility of the exchange rate depends on the volatility of the amounts 
available for consumption of the traded and non-traded goods. Our main result is to show 
that, in a one-good world, and contrary to the popular conjecture, an increase in exchange 
rate volatility is associated with an increase in the volume of trade. If a non-traded good is 
added, the above remains true when the source of exchange rate volatility is the uncertainty 
in the traded goods sector. However, when the source of exchange rate volatility is the non-
traded goods sector then the volume of trade may decline. Thus, our model offers at least a 
partial explanation for the results of empirical studies that find only a weak relation between 
exchange rate volatility and trade. A policy implication of the model is that the volatility of 
the real exchange rate can be reduced, and welfare increased, in two ways: by reducing the 
volatility of fundamentals and by reducing the barriers-to trade. However, while a reduction 
in trade barriers is  associated with an increase in trade,  a reduction in  the volatility of 
fundamentals leads to a reduction in trade. Thus, more trade does not always mean a higher 
welfare. 
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Our objective in this article is to analyze the relation between exchange rate volatility 
and the volume of international trade in developed economies, and to study how this relation 
is affected by the degree of openness of an economy. The analysis is carried out in a general 
equilibrium model where the volume of trade, the exchange rate, and the interest rates are all 
determined endogenously. The commodity markets are assumed to be partially segmented, 
but-given the focus of the study on developed economies-financial markets are perfectly 
integrated. 
Our work is motivated by the ongoing debate on the advantages of trading blocs that 
decrease barriers to trade, as a complement or a substitute for fixed-rate exchange regimes. 
Understanding  the relation  between  exchange  rate  volatility  and commodity  trade  is 
fundamental for the setting of exchange rate and tariff policy, and the importance of these 
issues can be gauged by the attention being given to exchange rate arrangements envisaged 
by members of the European Monetary System, and to trade agreements such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT  A) between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. 1 
However, there is no consensus as to how exchange rate risk is associated with the 
volume of trade. A popular conjecture is that an increase in exchange rate volatility leads to a 
reduction in the level of international trade, and a number of partial-equilibrium models 
support this view (see Cote (1994) for a survey of existing work). A typical argument in this 
literature is that higher exchange risk lowers the risk-adjusted expected revenue from exports, 
and therefore reduces the incentives to  trade.  In contrast, another strand of the literature 
argues that,  when firms  are allowed to  optimally respond to  exchange rate changes,  the 
revenue per unit of an exportable good (Sercu, 1992) or the entire cashflow from exporting 
(Franke (1991) and Sercu and van Hulle (1992»  are convex functions of the exchange rate. 
lOther trade coalitions include APEC, which consists of a trans-Pacific collection of countries; Caricom, which 
includes most of the Caribbean islands and Belize and Guyana, and is being extended to the Association of 
Caribbean Countries, which will include also the mainland countries around the rim; the Central American 
Common Market, linking Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica; the Andean Group, 
which consists of Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia; and, Mercosur, which is a group consisting 
of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  2 
From this it follows that expected unit revenue or the expected cashflow increases when the 
volatility of the exchange rate increases, which then acts as a stimulant to trade rather than a 
deterrent. This lack of consensus on the theoretical side is matched by a lack of agreement on 
the empirical front.2 Most empirical work fails to  find a strong negative relation between 
exchange rate volatility and trade,  and some empirical studies find that an increase in 
volatility may be associated with an increase in international trade (see, for example, Asseery 
and Peel (1991)). 
The result that exchange rate uncertainty always lowers the risk-adjusted expected 
revenue from exporting is derived in a partial equilibrium setting: most of this literature 
assumes that exchange rate uncertainty is the sole source of risk, and either ignores the 
availability of non-linear hedges (options, and portfolios of options) or takes the prices of the 
hedge instruments (or some of the determinants of these prices) as given. A similar criticism 
can be made regarding the results based on the convexity of revenues: this view takes the 
demand functions or the cashflow function as given, and therefore ignores the issue of how 
changes in the economy that have lead to  a higher exchange risk affect the demand or 
cashflow function.3 
To address these criticisms, we need a general-equilibrium approach as adopted in, 
for instance,  the  (neo-)c1assical trade  models.  However, these models  assume that all 
commodity markets are perfect; that is, the drawback of the neoclassical approach is that 
Commodity Price Parity (CPP) is assumed to hold at all times and for all goods, implying 
that there is no real exchange rate risk.4 Accordingly, our objective is to develop a model that 
2  See Cote (1994) for a summary of the results of empirical studies. 
3See, for example the papers by de Grauwe (1988), Sercu (1992), Sercu and van Hulle (1992)), and Viaene and 
de Vries (1992). 
4In a perfect-markets setting, PPP-deviations can still arise because of international differences in commodity 
preferences. However, such PPP-deviations are economically less interesting. In addition, Engel (1993) shows 
that,  as  a  source of PPP deviations, violations of Commodity Price Parity are far more important than 
differences in commodity preferences. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  3 
has the internal consistency of the general-equilibrium models of trade, but where commodity 
markets are sufficiently segmented to allow for deviations from CPP and meaningful changes 
in the real exchange rate. In our analysis, we model the segmentation of commodity markets 
by  allowing for both non-traded goods  (as  in,  for example, Stockman (1980)  and Stulz 
(1987)) and for costs for transferring commodities across countries (as in Dumas (1992) and 
Sercu, Uppal and Van Rulle (1995)). Financial markets, on the other hand, are assumed to be 
complete and perfectly integrated in our model.  Thus, consumers can make cross-border 
financial  investments-reflecting the  fact  that international capital markets  are far  less 
subject to restrictions than commodity markets. Likewise, firms can make optimal hedging 
decisions, and the prices of the hedge instruments are determined in a general-equilibrium 
framework. 
Our major results in this general-equilibrium model are the following. First, in an 
economy with only one (imperfectly tradable) good, an increase in exchange rate volatility 
must be caused by a higher riskiness of the outputs of that good; and this higher output risk, 
in turn, is associated with an increase in the expected volume of trade in goods. That is, while 
an increase in exchange rate uncertainty is associated with a lower welfare level, the optimal 
response of agents to the increase in uncertainty nevertheless is to trade more, not less (as 
conventional wisdom holds).  Thus, the convexity argument from the partial-equilibrium 
literature  is  qualitatively correct in  a  one-good economy.  Second,  we  show  that this 
conclusion is quite sensitive to the one-good assumption. If we introduce a non-traded good, 
the  conclusions from the  one-good model remain valid only if the source of increased 
exchange risk is an increased volatility in the tradable good's own output. However, when 
there is a higher output risk in the non-traded goods sector, this risk may either increase or 
decrease expected trade in the other good, and may  also either decrease or increase the 
variance of the exchange rate. Thus, in an economy with one non-traded and one traded good, 
there is no longer a clear association between exchange rate volatility and the expected level 
of trade-unless the source of the increased risk is just the output of the tradable goods 
sector. And even that last conclusion needs to be qualified as soon as a second tradable good 
is introduced: With two tradable goods, a higher risk in one of the tradable goods sectors still Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade 
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boosts expected trade within that same sector, but now generally has ambiguous effects on 
trade in the other tradable good and on exchange iisk. Thus, the convexity argument, as 
invoked  in  partial-equilibrium  models,  very  much  depends  on  the  ceteris paribus 
assumptions about the demand function or the cash-flow function; as soon as one allows for 
changes elsewhere in the economy, the cash-flow functions can shift in a way that obscures, 
or even reverses, the conclusions from the partial analysis. 
Our model also has the following policy implications. Given the construction of the 
model, volatility of the real exchange rates can be reduced in two ways: (a) by reducing the 
volatility of fundamentals and (b) by reducing the barriers to trade. Both measures lead to an 
increase in welfare but have opposite effects on trade: a reduction in trade barriers leads to an 
increase in trade, while a reduction in the volatility of fundamentals leads to a drop in trade. 
Thus, to draw conclusions about welfare, it is not sufficient to focus on just the volume of 
trade. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe the general 
economy that we use in our analysis. In Section II, we consider a world with one good, and 
show that in this setting the relation between exchange rate volatility and the volume of 
international trade is positive. In Section III, we add a non-traded good, and show how the 
volatility of the non-traded good output may affect the conclusions of the one-good model. 
Section IV examines  the  effects of adding  a  second tradable  good.  We present our 
conclusions in Section V. The major results of each section are collected in propositions, the 
proofs of which are presented in Appendix A and B. 
1.  The Economy 
In this section, we present a model of two countries (k = 1, 2) that have perfectly integrated 
financial markets but segmented commodity markets. That is, capital markets are assumed to 
be complete and frictionless (implying that asset prices are equal across countries, after 
conversion into the same reference currency), but it is costly to trade goods internationally. In Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  5 
what follows,  we describe the endowment process and the preferences of consumers, and 
derive the implications of the model for the volume of trade and the real exchange rate. 
In every period, each country has a stochastic endowment of up to three non-storable 
goods with different degrees of tradability. We index the three goods in ascending order of 
tradability: the first commodity (j = 1)  is entirely non-traded, the  second good (j = 2)  is 
homogenous across countries and can be traded at a cost, and the third good (j = 3), also 
homogenous across countries, that is perfectly tradable. The introduction of a perfectly traded 
good, besides the imperfectly tradable one, allows us to assess the interactions between the 
volumes of trade of the two tradable goods.5 
The endowment in country k at time t of each of these goods is denoted by qkit). 
These stochastic endowments may  be given exogenously, as  in  Lucas'  (1982) exchange 
economy, or could be the result of endogenous investment decisions, as in Dumas' (1992) 
production economy. If, in the production economy, the goods act simultaneously as capital 
goods and consumption goods, the "output" of good j in country k has to  be interpreted as 
output net of reinvestment. 6 
The home and foreign country (k =  1 and 2, respectively) are assumed to be populated 
by a large and equal number of infinitely-lived consumers with identical, multiplicative 
commodity preferences over the three goods, and identical, constant relative risk aversion: 
5We introduce this third good also because, in the absence of such a perfectly tradable good, there can be 
protracted periods where there is absolutely no trade. We have also worked with a three-country model that has 
two imperfectly traded goods besides a non-traded one, without obtaining any new insights. These results are 
discussed briefly in the concluding section. 
6The process for net output, in a production economy, is likely to be more complicated than in an exchange 
economy-see, for instance, Dumas (1992)-but our conclusions do not depend on a particular stochastic 
process for the net outputs. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  6 
where CkjCt) denote the consumption of goodj in country k. 
The factors  that distinguish one country from another, and lead to  trade between 
them,  are the following.  First,  the initial wealth of the  two  countries may be different. 
Second, the outputs of the three goods generally differ across countries. By definition, in the 
non-tradable goods sector it is not possible to  reduce such imbalances by shipping these 
goods (the cost for trading good 1, 'q, is equal to infinity). While it is possible to export the 
imperfectly tradable good from  one country to  another, any such transfer is costly. This 
transaction cost is modeled, following Dumas (1992), as a waste of resources: if one unit is 
shipped, only 1/(1 +'t2) units actually arrive (00 > 't2 > 0). The transaction cost implies that, 
within a certain region, it will be optimal not to trade even when the price of the tradable 
good at home is different from that abroad. Thus, the different outputs generally imply 
international deviations from Commodity Price Parity for both the non-traded good and the 
imperfectly tradable good. 
Given that individuals are identical within each country, the model can be expressed 
in terms of two representative consumers, one for each country. Rather than considering 
decentralized decision-making, we look at the problem from a central planner's perspective. 
Given our assumption of complete and frictionless  financial  markets, the  decentralized 
solution is identical to that of the central planner, but analyzing the central planner's problem 
allows  us  to  identify  the  optimal  policies for  consumption  and  trade  in  a  relatively 
straightforward way.8  In the decentralized solution, the initial relative wealth of the two 
7The special case where 11 = 1 is represented by the log utility function. This utility specification yields the same 
first-order conditions as the ones obtained by setting 11  equal to unity in the case for the utility function in (1), 
and the same expressions for trade and the real exchange rate. Thus, the implications for the log utility function 
are similar to the ones we derive for the case 11  :F- 1. 
8Por example, Uppal (1993) sho ws how the solution to the central planner's problem obtained in Dumas (1992) 
can be derived in a decentralized setting. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  7 
countries would detennine how the claims on future consumption are distributed between 
them. In the equivalent central planner's problem, given in (2), differences in initial wealth 
are reflected by different weights in the central planner's objective function; these weights 
then detennine the distribution of consumption across the two countries. 
Let xklt) denote the amount of good j  exported from country k (measured before 
transactions costs) at time t. The central planner's objective is to choose the sequence {Xk/t)} 
so as to maximize the weighted aggregate utility, where the weights are denoted by 8k: 
subject to: 
X2(t) 
Cllt) = qlj(t) -XI/t) +  ,j=l,  2,3 , 
1+~j 
c21t)  = q2j{t) -X2j(t) + xdt),  j=l, 2, 3, 
1+~j 





and where ~l = 00 ,0 <  ~2 <  00 ,  ~3 = 0,8 is the subjective discount factor, and U(Ck(t)), k = 
{I, 2} is as defined in (1). 
The central planner's decision rules for consumption and trade in the general case are 
summarized in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, and the equilibrium real exchange rate is derived in 
Proposition 1.3. The proofs are given in the appendix, and the implications are discussed in 
Sections II to IV. Thus, in this section we just provide a qualitative introduction to  the  -
propositions. 
The logic behind the optimal consumption policies is as follows. If  all the goods were 
perfectly tradable, then it would be optimal for the central planner to equate the 8-weighted 
marginal utility of consumption for each good across the two countries. This is, in fact, what 
the central planner does for the perfectly tradable good (good 3). However, for a good that is 
costly to trade, it is not optimal to equate, across countries, the weighted marginal utility 
from consuming this good. Thus, for good 2 which has a strictly positive shipping cost, the Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  8 
first-order conditions imply that there will be a no-trade zone within which international 
imbalances  in  the  weighted  marginal  utility  of  consuming  this  good  will  be  left 
uncorrected-notably when the cost of shipping outweighs the utility gained by reducing the 
international imbalance in the consumption of this good. Similarly, even when this good is 
actually transferred across countries, shipments will still be restricted to the level where the 
cost of shipping the last unit has become equal to the incremental gain in aggregate weighted 
utility; that is, such shipments will still fall short of equating the weighted marginal utilities 
from consuming that good. Finally, since the cost for shipping the non-traded good (good 1) 
is infinite, no attempt is made to balance internationally the marginal utility from consuming 
this good. 
The consumption behavior described above has the following implications for trade: 
good 1 is never traded, and good 3 is always traded so  that the marginal utility from its 
consumption is balanced across countries. Trade in good 2 occurs only when the ratio of the 
two marginal utilities from its consumption exceeds a particular bound. Thus, it is possible to 
divide the state space into three critical regions indexed by (superscript) i, where i = {O,  I, 2}. 
The three states depend on trade in good 2:  in state 0, there is no  trade in the imperfectly 
tradable good (good 2); in state 1, country 1 exports good 2; and, in state 2, country 2 exports 
good 2. It  will be convenient to express our results in terms of these three states. Many of our 
results also depend on consumption ratios rather than levels;  thus,  we will use  Kj(t)  == 
[C2/t)!cl}\t)] to denote the ratio, at time t  and in state i, of the optimal consumptions of good 
j. 
Proposition 1.1: In each of  the states i, the optimal consumption ratios across countries for 
the three goods are: 
Kl (t)  ==  C21 (t)  - q21 (t)  in all states i, 
cu(t)  - q11(t)  (4) Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade 
q22(t) 
q12(t)  ifi =0 
.  C22(t) 
Ki(t)  ==  C12(t)  =  (1 +'t2)-<X  (92f91)a  (Kl  (t»)~  ifi = 1 




ifi =  0 
(1 + 't) Ki(t) 
1 
--K~(t) 
ifi = 1  (6) 
where 
1+'t 
1  if q22(t) <  (1+'t2)-<X  (e2fel)a  (Kl(t))~ 
q12(t) 
i =  2  if  q22(t) > (1+'t2)+a  (e2fel)a  (Kl(t»)~ 
q12(t) 
o otherwise 
ifi =  2 
[country 1 is exporting good 2]; 
[country 2 is exporting good 2];  (7) 
[good 2 is not traded] 
(8) 
The  optimal  export  policies,  presented  in  Proposition  1.2,  follow  from  the 
consumption behavior described above. Equation (9) states that the first good, being non-
tradable, is never exported. Equation (10) gives the optimal amount of good 2 that should be 
exported from country 1 (in state 1), and (11) gives the optimal exports of the same good 
from country 2 (in state 2). Note that the conditions in the max operators in (10) and (11) 
corresponds to  the conditions for trade to  occur,  given in  (7).  Equations (12)  and (13) 
describe the volume of good three that will be exported in state i from country 1 and country 
2, respectively. 
Proposition 1.2: The optimal levels of  trade for the three goods are given by: 
For good 1:  Xll(t) =X21(t) =  0;  (9) Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade 
For good 2: 
For good 3:  X13(t)  = 
X23(t)  = 
1.  Max(  K~  (t) q13(t) - q23(t) , 0) , 
1 + K3(t) 
1.  Max ( q23(t) - K~  (t) q13(t)  ,0). 






Lastly we derive the real exchange rate. The intuition underlying this derivation is the 
following. The real exchange rate in a one-good economy is given by the ratio of weighted 
marginal utility of consumption abroad to that at home. In our multi-good economy with 
homothetic utility functions, it is possible to define one composite consumption good per 
country, and the real exchange rate can be shown to be the ratio of the a-weighted marginal 
utilities of consuming each composite good. In the case of multiplicative utility functions, 
these marginal utilities of composite consumption can then be decomposed into the marginal 
utilities of consuming each separate good. As, for good 3, the a-weighted marginal utilities 
are perfectly equalized, we end up  with a real exchange rate that depends  only on the 
consumption ratios for goods 2 and 3: 
Proposition 1.3: The real exchange rate can be expressed as: 
1 
(14) 
From Propositions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, we see that it is possible to express explicitly the 
real exchange rate and the volume of trade as functions of the state variables, the outputs of 
the goods. In the rest of the paper, we will examine how an increase in the volatility in one of 
the state variables affects the expected volume of trade and the volatility of the exchange rate. 
To facilitate the exposition, we will start by considering a specialized version of the general Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  11 
economy described above-an economy with only the imperfectly tradable good. We will 
consider the effect of introducing a non-traded good in Section III and that of the perfectly-
tradable good in Section IV. 
II.  Trade and Exchange Rate Risk in a Single-Good Model 
In this section, we consider a special case of the model described in the previous section-
one in which there is only a single good-the imperfectly-tradable good (good 2). In what 
follows, we first establish the relation between expected trade and output uncertainty, and 
then consider the effect of output risk on the volatility of the exchange rate. We conclude this 
section with a discussion of the generality of these results. 
II.A.  The Effect of  Output Risk on Expected Trade 
To obtain the model with only the imperfectly-tradable good, we set e2 = 1 and el =  e3 =  0 in 
Proposition 1.1. The implication is that the consumption ratios when trade is positive, K1 and 
K~, become constants: 
(15) 




X22(t) =  Max( q22(t)  - K~  q12(t), 0) . 
K~/(1  +t2) + 1 
(17) 
To  see how  the expected volume  of trade is affected by  the  uncertainty of the 
underlying future outputs, we need to define what "higher uncertainty" means. As we do not 
want to restrict the analysis to normally or lognormally distributed variables, the variance of Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  12 
the future net output is not a sufficiently general measure of uncertainty. Instead, we define 
the "riskiness" of the realization of a variable at a future date, T, as in Rothschild and Stigiitz 
(1970): a random variable Yl(T) is said to be more risky than another variable Y2(T) if Yl(T) 
can be decomposed into Yl(T) =  Y2(T) + E, with E[E I  Y2(T)] =  0.9 
We first apply this concept to  a relative measure of trade, viz. the ratios of time-T 
exports to local output. From (16) and (17), these ratios are given by 
X12(T)  =  1  Max(K21  _ q22(T)  0) 
q12(T)  1/(1 +"C2) + K~  qI2(T)  ,  , 
(18) 
X22(T)  =  1  Max(~ _  q12(T)  0) 
q22(T)  1/0  +"C2) + 1/K~  K~  q22(T) ,  . 
(19) 
Noting that the functions in (18) and (19) are convex in the ratio of relative outputs, Jensen's 
Inequality immediately implies that the expected ratio of time-T exports to time-T output 
increases when the riskiness of relative output increases. This conclusion can be related to 
analogous results from the literature on financial options. The volume of domestic exports as 
a fraction of local output, given in (18), is similar to the payoff of a European-style put 
option, with (known) contract size [1/(1  +"C2) + ~]-1 and (known) strike price Ki, written on a 
process [q22(T)/q12(T)]. Since this payoff is convex in [Q22(T)/Q12(T)], the expected payoff is 
an increasing function of the riskiness of [Q22(T)/Q12(T)].10 
Similar results can be obtained for the ratio of net imports over local output: 
9nms, a higher riskiness also implies a higher variance. However, the reverse is not necessarily true: with non-
normal or non-lognormal distributions, for instance, a higher variance need not imply a higher riskiness. 
Specifically, a  higher Rothschild-Stiglitz riskiness affects the entire distribution and,  therefore, rules out 
changes in the variance that are due only to a change in an extreme tail of the distribution. 
lOMerton (1973, Theorem 8) shows that, independent of the investors attitudes towards risk, the market value of 
an option is a positive function of the riskiness of the underlying process. The expected value is the market 
value in the special case of risk-neutrality and a zero interest rate. Thus, Merton's theorem about market values 






These functions are convex in relative output and are similar to payoffs from a European-
style call option. We conclude that, in a comparative statics sense, an increased riskiness of 
the relative output leads to a higher expected ratio of exports and imports relative to  local 
output. 
From equations (16) and (17), we can make similar statements about the expected 
level of trade rather than trade expressed as a fraction of local output. The volume of exports 
is convex in both q12(T) and q22(T), and corresponds to  the payoff from a European-style 
option to  exchange two risky payoffs, q22(T) and q12(T).11  From the convexity of these 
payoffs it follows that, conditional on one of the outputs, the expected volume of trade is a 
positive function of the riskiness of the other output. This, in tum, implies that also  the 
unconditional expected volume of trade is positive in the riskiness of either output.12 We 
summarize these results as follows. 
Proposition 2.1: In a model with a single good that is tradable at afinite cost, the expected 
volume of  trade, and the expected ratio of  trade to local output, are positive functions of  the 
riskiness of  the output of  the good abroad or at home. 
To get an exact expression for expected trade, and to illustrate these distribution-free 
results  in closed-form,  one needs to  make  specific assumptions  about the  endowment 
llSee Margrabe (1978) for an analysis of such options. 
12The above results relate to the expected level of exports of either country 1 or 2, but immediately carry over 
to imports and to the total level of a country's international trade. This is because net domestic imports, after 
transactions costs, are obtained by simply dividing the above gross foreign exports by (1 +'t2). Thus, expected 
trade for one country, being the sum of its expected exports and expected imports, is a positive function of the 
risk of relative output. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  14 
process. For instance, let the endowment processes for the tradable good be given by log 
random walks, in continuous or discrete time, with constant drifts aIld variances: 13 
where the correlation between the output of the tradable goods at home and abroad is denoted 
by  P2, which is assumed to  be  constant and less than unity.  Given that the volume of 
domestic [foreign] exports (16) [(17)] is similar to  the payoff of an option to exchange two 
risky assets at the rate  K~ [11K!]  and the underlying distribution is jointly lognormal, the 
expression for the expected trade volume is similar to  the solution by Margrabe (1978) for 
the value of an  option to exchange two risky assets with log-normally distributed future 
prices. Thus, we obtain the following corollary to Proposition 2.1. 
Corollary 2.1: In a one-good model with lognormal outputs, the conditional expectation at 
time  t,  of foreign  exports at a  later date  T,  is a  positive function of the  variance of 
[q22(Dlq12(D], and therefore a positive function of  the variance of  either q22<n or Q12(D. 
This expectation is given by 
Et[Q22(Dl N(dl) - K? Et[Q12(Dl N(d2)  = 
K~/(  1  +1:2) + 1 
(23) 
where  Et(Qk2(D) =  Qk2(t)exp{llk2 (T  -t)}, k =  {I, 2}  (24) 
13With a lognonnal process, an increased variance also means an increased riskiness. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  15 
N(d)  = the probability that z s d, z a unit normal random variable. 
In the next section, we find that a higher level of output riskiness also leads to  a 
higher exchange rate volatility, implying that,  in a  one-good model, there is a  positive 
association between expected trade and exchange rate volatility. 
II.B.  The Effect of  Output Risk on the Variance of  the Real Exchange Rate 
With el =  e3 =  0 in the general expression for the exchange rate in (14), the real exchange 
rate in the one-good case is: 
(26) 
As is standard in the literature (because of its symmetry), we consider the log of the exchange 
rate. Using (5), we can then expand (26) to: 
lnS(t)= 
if q22(t) < ~1. 
q12(t) - 2' 
In 82  _  11 In q22(t)  if K} <q22(t) < ~2. 
81  q12(t)  2 - qI2(t) - 2,  (27) 
Thus,  the  10 g  real  exchange  rate  is  a  linear  transformation  of a  truncated  variate, 
In[Q22(t)/q12(t)], where the values of the log output ratio that fall outside the no-trade region 
are replaced by the constants InK1 and In Kr. We show, in Appendix B, that the an increase in 
riskiness in the output of either country leads to an increase in the volatility of the exchange 
rate under the following conditions. 
Proposition 2.2: Three alternative conditions sufficient for vart(lnS(T))  to  be a positive 
function of  the riskiness of  relative output are: 
(a)  The underlying variable, In[Q22(D/Q12(D], is normally distrbuted; Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  16 
(b)  The distribution ojln[Q22(D/Q12(DJ  is  unimodal and the mode lies within the no-
trade region. 
(c)  The density junction is concave over the no-trade region. 
Proposition 2.2 can be interpreted as follows. Suppose fIrst that the no-trade zone is 
around the middle of the distribution of relative output. From (15), we know that an increase 
in the variance of the relative output does not affect ~  and 1(1, that is, the bounds of this no-
trade domain. With a unimodal and symmetric distribution (such as the normal distribution), 
the effect of an increase in uncertainty then is to  lower the probability that future relative 
output will be in the no-trade zone; that is, the probability of trade increases. But non-zero 
trade also implies that S(D is at one of its bounds (see (27)). The implication is that, when 
risk increases, more and more of the probability mass of InS(D is moved from the middle of 
the distribution towards the bounds, which increases the variance of the log exchange rate. 
From Proposition 2.2, we see that one case where the variance of the log of the 
exchange rate may decrease with an increase in the riskiness of relative output is when, in the 
no-trade  domain,  the  density  function  is  substantially  more  convex than  the  normal 
distribution. One example that has a sufficiently strong local convexity is the mixture of 
uniform distribitions (the "step" distribution): if the discountinuity in the density is situated 
within the no-trade zone and very close to one of the bounds of that zone, the variance of the 
truncated variable will actually decrease when the riskiness of the underlying goes up.14 
However, most economists would consider this example far-fetched. We numerically verified 
-
the properties of the Pareto-Levy sum-stable and the Student's distributions with a low 
number of degrees  of freedom.  These distributions  are  less  unappealing  than  the  step 
distribution, and, being very fat-tailed and peaked-at-the-center, appeared to  be a priori 
candidates for a  sufficienly strong convexity at the beginning of the tails.  However, no 
negative association between the riskiness of the underlying and the variance of the truncated 
14This is shown fonnally in the appendix, in the concluding part of the proof to Proposition 2.2. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  17 
variable was observed-not even for the limiting case of the Cauchy distribution, which is so 
fat-tailed that even the first moment does not eyist. Thus, a negative link between vart(lnS(T)) 
and the riskiness of In[q22(T)/q12(T)] is unlikely, except possibly for extremely artificial 
distributions. 
[I.C.  Concluding Comments Relating to the Analysis of  the One-Good Case 
We summarize the results for the one-good case as follows. 
Proposition 2.3: In a model with only one good that is tradable at a cost, there is a positive 
association between exchange rate volatility and the expected volume of  trade. 
The existence of a positive shipping cost is crucial for our final conclusion. With 
't2 = 0, in a single-good world the real exchange rate would always equal unity and its 
variance would therefore be zero regardless of the riskiness of relative output. Thus, as in a 
neo-classical free-trade model, there would be no association between the average volume of 
trade and real exchange rate volatility. In contrast, the effect of output volatility on the 
expected volume of trade would be stronger rather than weaker when 't2 = 0.15 Thus, from a 
policy perspective, a reduction in the barriers to trade  ('t2~0), leads to both a decline in real 
exchange rate volatility and an increase in expected trade. 
Our conclusions still hold when a non-traded good is added to the model, as long as 
the output process for this good is non-stochastic. To see this, note from Propositions 1.1 and 
1.2 that the critical output ratios for good 2,  ~  and K~, would then also become functions of 
the relative output of the non-traded good (good 1). However, in the deterministic case the 
effect of a non-unit value for q21(T)/qll(T) is no different from the effect of unequal 8's. 
150bserve that if 't2 is zero, the zone of no shipping would shrink to a single ray with slope (8218011rl, which 
would mark the (smooth) transition from exports to imports. That is, when we set 't2 equal to zero, the volume 
of trade becomes similar to the payoff from a straddle rather than the payoff from a vertical combination. Thus, 
with 't2 =  0 the convexity would be even more marked than in the case "C2 > 0, and expected trade would be 
more sensitive to changes in riskiness in the same way as a straddle is more sensitive to changes in volatility 
than a vertical combination. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  18 
Specifically, Ki  and ~  would still be non-stochastic and all our earlier inferences would, 
therefore, continue to hold.  The assumption of risk-free outputs in  the non-traded goods 
sector is not necessarily unreasonable: empirically the output of, say, services is much less 
volatile than the output of industrial goods and, crucially, is also less related to changes in the 
real exchange rate. However, the non-tradable goods sector in most countries is also large, so 
that it remains useful to explore the effect of risk in this sector on the expected level of trade. 
This is done in Section III. 
Note that our conclusions with respect to trade of good 2 hold even when a perfectly 
tradable good-good 3 with 't3 = O-is added. To see this, note from Propositions 1.2 and 1.3 
that, neither trade in good 2 nor S(t) is affected by q23(t)!q13(t); thus, the results about trade 
for good 2 are qualitatively unaffected by the addition of good 3.16 However, the reverse is 
not true: from equations (12) and 13), trade in good 3 itself (and, therefore, also total trade) is 
affected by the output of good 2. Thus, to make any statement about total trade, we also need 
to know whether the effect of increased risk in the output of good 1, on trade of good 2, is not 
undone by an opposite effect on trade of good 3. This analysis is considered in Section IV. 
It  is important to note that although the unconditional relation between exchange rate 
volatility and trade in the single-good model is positive, this effect need not be obvious in 
small-sample data. First, sample parameters (such as average trade and ex post exchange rate 
volatility) are noisy estimates of the popUlation parameters used in our analysis. Second, 
when trade is already intense and can be expected to remain so  in the future, the effect of 
increased risk on the variance of the real exchange rate and on the expected volume of trade 
is small. With respect to expected trade, this is because strict convexities occur only at the 
points lC1 or lC~. Thus, if it is unlikely that these critical values will be reached, the effect of 
the convexity on the expected level of trade is small. With respect to the real exchange rate, 
16The  intuition for  this  is  that it is always optimal to  balance internationally the marginal  utility from 
consuming the third good. This, with our assumption of a multiplicative utility function, implies that the ratio of 
outputs of the third good drops out of the expressions for the exchange rate, trade, and the consumption of 
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when the probability of trade is very high, the effect of riskiness on the variance of the real 
excha...~ge rate is small because the exchange rate then, almost surely, is at one of its bounds. 
Thus, under those circumstances exchange rate variability is already small and is hardly 
affected by variations in output risk. 
Lastly, the relation between trade and exchange rate volatility implied by the general 
equilibrium model is non-linear. Thus, the linear regression model frequently used by 
empirical studies to estimate the relation between trade and exchange rate volatility is 
misspecified. 
III.  A Model with Stochastic Output of  Non-Traded Goods 
In this section, we consider whether the results derived in Section 2  for a  single-good 
economy generalize to an economy with two goods-a non-traded good and an imperfectly 
traded good-both with stochastic output. Our analysis of the relation between exchange rate 
volatility and trade is divided into two parts: we first study the case where the source of the 
increase in risk is the sector producing the imperfectly tradable good and then the case where 
the source of the increase in risk is the non-traded goods sector. Our main results in this 
section are that: (a) The conclusion of the previous section is still valid: when the increase in 
exchange rate volatility comes from the sectors producing the imperfectly-tradable goods, 
then exchange rate volatility is positively related to  the volume of trade;  (b) However, an 
increase in exchange rate uncertainty arising from increased variability in the non-traded 
goods sectors, may be associated with either an increase or a decrease in expected trade, and 
the effect on the variability of the exchange rate is also ambiguous. 
The presence of a non-traded good (good 1) with stochastic output affects the bounds 
on the relative consumption of good 2 in two ways: one, the location of the region of no-trade Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  20 
is  affected  and  two,  the  slope of the  trade  function  is  affected.17  Or,  usmg  options 
terminology, the volume of trade now becomes similar to  the payoff from a portfolio of 
options where both the strike prices and the contract sizes are functions of two stochastic 
variables, the outputs in sector 1.  In this section, we examine how the conclusions of the 
previous section are affected by this randomness in Ki(t) and Ki(t). 
III.A.  Effect of  Increased Risk in the Imperfectly-Tradable Goods Sector 
As we noted, in the presence of a non-traded goods sector with a stochastic output, Ki(t) and 
K~(t) may vary over time. From this it follows that conditional on the levels of these non-
traded outputs, the relation between trade and the volatility of outputs of good 2 is similar to 
that in the one-good case. Since this is true for all possible levels of the outputs of the non-
traded goods, it is also true unconditionally. Thus, an increase in risk arising from the non-
traded goods sector leads to an increase in the volume of trade. 
Similarly, the effect of an increase in risk in the imperfectly-tradable goods sector on 
exchange rate volatility is positive-as it was  in the previous section.  This is because, 
conditional on relative output in the non-traded goods sector, an increase in riskiness in 
sector 2 has the same effect as in a one-good model: the variance of the log real exchange 
rate increases with the riskiness of sector 2. 
Proposition 3.1: In an economy with a non-traded good and a good that is tradable at a cost, 
both the expected level of trade and vart(lnS(T)) are positive functions of the riskiness of 
output in the imperfectly-tradable good sector. Thus, when the source of  increased risk is the 
tradable goods  sector,  expected trade and the  variance of the  real exchange  rate  are 
positively related. 
I7The location of the bounds now depends not only on relative wealth, the shipping cost, and risk aversion (as 
in the one-good case), but also on the relative output of good 1 and on the openness of the economy (as given by 
102, the proportion of expenditure of the tradable good in total spending). Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  21 
The results of Sections II and III.A are similar to the conclusions of the partial-
equilibrium model of Sercu (1991):  a higher exchange risk is  associated with a  higher 
probability that the deviation from CPP will be sufficient to allow trade. However, Sercu's 
analysis takes the demand curve as given. Thus, in Sections III.B and IV we analyze how the 
demand for good 2 is affected by the changing endowments of other goods, and how this 
affects trade. 
III.B.  Effect of  Increased Risk in the Non-Traded Goods Sector 
To identify whether increased risk in the non-traded goods sector on average boosts 
trade or not, we need to find out whether trade in good 2 is convex or concave in the relative 
outputs of the non-tradable good. This can be done by differentiating the expression for 
exports and imports with respect to the relative outputs of the non-tradable good. We find 
that the sign of this derivative cannot be determined unambiguously: exports are convex or 
concave depending on the magnitude of  Tt relative to 1, and the size of  1(1.18 The presence of 
both convex and concave sections in the function  for net trade implies that,  when the 
riskiness of the relative output in sector 1 increases, the expected value of trade may either 
increase or decrease, depending on the location and dispersion of the probability distribution. 
Proposition 3.2: In a model with a non-traded good besides the imperfectly tradable good, 
an increase in the riskiness in the non-traded goods sector may be associated either with an 
increase or a decrease in expected trade. 
We next consider the relation  between  risk in the  non-traded  goods  sector and 
exchange rate volatility. From (14), when £3 =  0, the log of the real exchange rate is: 
18The effects of a higher output of good 1 are, first, an increase in real wealth in at least one country, and 
second, a change of the relative price of goods 1 and 2 in at least one country. Thus, a higher output of good 1 in 
one country could either increase or decrease demand for good 2, depending on whether the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect or vice versa. The watershed case is the log utility function (11=1,  that is, 
U(q  ,C2) = lnC!  + lnc2), where demand for good 2 is independent of consumption of good 1. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  22 
(28) 
A higher riskiness of 1(1 (T) now has three effects. First, it directly increases the variance of 
the second tenn in (28). Second, a higher riskiness in 1(1 (T) affects the covariance between 
the last two tenns. Lastly, it randomizes the bounds on  ~(t). It turns out that the sign of the 
net effect cannot be determined unambiguously. 
Proposition 3.3: In a model with a non-traded good besides the imperfectly tradable good, 
an increase in the riskiness in the non-traded goods sector may be associated either with an 
increase or a decrease in vart(lnS(T). 
III.C.  Conclusions/rom the Model with a Non-Traded and a Tradable Good 
We find that, for given riskiness of the non-traded goods sector, when the change of risk is 
confined to the tradable-goods sector, our earlier conclusions still obtain: trade and exchange 
rate volatility are positively related. However, when the source of the extra risk is the non-
traded goods sector,  this may no  longer be true;  the  outcome depends  on whether the 
conditional joint distribution of the outputs implies a predominantly convex relation between 
relative output in sector 1 and trade in good 2, or a predominantly concave one. We also find 
that a higher riskiness in sector 1 may affect the variance of the exchange rate positively or 
negatively, depending on the value of the risk aversion coefficient and the openness of the 
economy. Thus,  the  addition of a  non-traded good with  stochastic output obscures the 
positive effect of sector-2 risk on  both the expected level of trade and exchange rate 
volatility. 
To summarize: the addition of the non-traded good allows us to identify one reason 
why the results from the simple one-good model may be misleading. In the next section, we 
show how interactions between the trade volumes of two goods, both tradable, provide 
similar sources of concavities and strict convexities, thus reinforcing the conclusions of this 
section. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  23 
IV.  The Effect of  Adding a Second Traded Good 
In this section, we consider the general model with all three goods: one that cannot be traded 
at all, a second that is tradable at a cost, and a third that can be traded costlessly. Below, we 
discuss the effects of increased risk in a particular sector, starting with sector 3 itself. 
IV.A.  The Effects of  Risk in the Perfectly Traded Goods Sector 
From equations (12) and (13), we see that for the perfectly tradable good, the absolute 
amount of trade is a piecewise linear (V  -shaped) function of the endowments of that good. 
That is, because good 3 is always traded, the no-trade zone observed for good 2 is absent for 
this good, but the pattern is otherwise similar to what holds for good 2. It follows that, like 
for sector 2, expected trade of good 3 is a positive function of the riskiness of the output in its 
own sector. 
To verify whether this conclusion holds not just for trade in good 3 but also for 
overall trade, we need to verify that the higher output risk in sector 3 does not induce lower 
trade in good 2. This is easily established: from equations (10) and (11), trade in good 2 is 
unaffected by the output or consumption of good 3. Therefore, a higher output risk in sector 3 
boosts trade in good 3 with no offsetting effect on trade in good 2, implying that overall trade 
increases. 
However, a higher riskiness in the output of good 3 does not lead to an increased 
variability in the exchange rate. The absence of such a relation follows immediately from 
Proposition  1.3:  output of the perfectly tradable good has  no  direct effect on the real 
exchange rate, nor does it have an indirect effect through relative consumption of the other 
goods (see equations (4) and (5». We summarize as follows: 
Proposition 4.1: Increases in output risk of  a perfectly traded good boost expected trade but 
not the variability of the exchange rate. Thus, such changes in risk cannot be a source of Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  24 
positive or negative association between the  expected level of trade and exchange rate 
volatility. 
IV.B.  The Effects of  Output Risk in the Non-traded Goods Sector 
We already know that the addition of a perfectly tradable good does not affect the real 
exchange rate (Proposition 1.3) nor the expected level of trade in sector 2 (Proposition 1.2). 
Thus, our conclusions from Section III, regarding the effects of the riskiness of the non-
traded goods sector,  still hold when a perfectly traded good is added: the variability of the 
output in the non-traded goods sector has ambiguous effects on both the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the expected level of trade in good 2. All we need to verify is whether the 
effect of output risk in sector 1 on trade in good 3 reinforces, or offsets, the effect of trade in 
sector 2. 
From the discussion in Section III.B. we already know that trade in both good 2 and 3 
can be concave or convex functions of the relative output in the non-tradable good sector. 
Thus, increased risk in sector 1 may be associated with either an increase or a decrease in 
trade for good 3, depending on whether the distribution of Kl (I) is mostly in the concave 
section of the function or in the convex section. Nor can we hope that concavities for trade in 
good 2 are always more than offset by convexities in good 3 and vice versa. Indeed, from the 
expressions for  K~(t) and K~(t) in Proposition 1.2, we see that the effect of q21(t)lq21(t) on 
K~(t) and  K~(t) is similar: when the downward-sloping part of trade of good 2 is convex 
(concave), the downward-sloping part of trade of good 3 is convex (concave) too, and 
similarly for the positive-sloped sections. Thus, concavities for one good are not generally 
offset by convexities for the other good. As a result, an increase in risk in sector 1 may lead 
to a reduction of expected trade in each of the traded goods. This confirms the conclusions 
from the two-good case discussed in Section III.B. 
Proposition 4.2: An increase in the riskiness in the non-traded goods sector has ambiguous 
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IV.C.  The Effects of  Output Risk in the Imperfectly Tradable Goods Sector 
Lastly, we investigate how our conclusions from  Section II  are  affected by the 
addition of the third good. First, both the exchange rate and trade in good 2 are unaffected by 
the introduction of a perfectly tradable good; thus, output risk in sector 2 still boosts the 
variability of the exchange rate as well as the expected level of trade in good 2, as in Section 
II. All we need to add is an analysis of how output risk in sector 2 affects trade in good 3. 
The arguments used in Section m.B can be repeated to show that trade in good 3, as a 
function of relative consumption of another good, is  V -shaped with one convex and one 
concave leg. When this other good is the non-traded one (good 1, as in Section III), relative 
consumption of good I is identical to its relative output, thus inducing a concave/convex V-
shaped relation between trade of good 3 and relative output of good 1. But when the other 
good is the (imperfectly tradable)  good 2,  relative consumption of good 2  becomes a 
piecewise linear function of its output rather than being identical to it (Proposition 1.1). Thus, 
trade in good 3 as a function of relative consumption of another good, has not only both 
convex and concave sections, but also  abrupt changes in the slopes-notably when the 
relative output in sector 2 reaches the critical values that determine whether good 2 is traded 
or not.  Thus,  the concave  (convex)  sections  are now  interrupted by  local convexities 
(concavities). Thus, it is a fortiori difficult to predict the effect of increased risk in sector 2 
on trade in good 3. 
Proposition 4.3: When a peifectly tradable good is introduced, a higher risk in the relative 
output of sector 2 still increases exchange risk and expected trade in  good 2, but has an 
uncertain effect on trade in good 3. Thus,  the effects on total trade are uncertain, implying 
that the relation between exchange rate volatility and total trade is ambiguous. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  26 
v.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the relation between the volume of trade and exchange rate volatility 
in a general equilibrium, two-country economy with three goods: one that cannot be traded, a 
second that is tradable at a cost and a third that can be traded costlessly. While commodity 
markets are assumed to be segmented, we assume that financial markets are complete and 
perfect. Our main results are the following. If there is only one (imperfectly-tradable) good, a 
change in output risk affects the expected volume of trade and exchange rate volatility in the 
same direction, thus creating a positive association between the two. We show, however, that 
the inferences from a one-good economy can be misleading: if the source of volatility in the 
exchange rate is the non-traded goods sector, the relation between exchange rate volatility 
and trade is no longer unambiguously positive. Given that the magnitude of the non-traded 
goods sector in developed economies is large, our model is consistent with the findings of 
empirical studies that the relation between exchange rate volatility and trade is weak. These 
conclusions are reinforced when a perfectly-tradable good is added: a higher risk in the non-
traded goods sector has ambiguous effects on expected trade in both the imperfectly-tradable 
good and the perfectly-tradable one; likewise, a higher risk in the imperfectly-tradable goods 
sector may boost or reduce expected trade in the perfectly-tradable goods sector. 
The general-equilibrium analysis sheds light on two  types of conclusions that are 
obtained from  partial-equilibrium  models.  The  first  result  obtained  using  a  partial-
equilibrium approach is that an increase in exchange risk lowers the risk-adjusted expected 
-
revenue from exports and, therefore, reduces the incentives to  trade. This view ignores the 
existence of hedges against exchange risk, or takes the price of these hedges (or some of the 
determinants of these prices) as given. In contrast, our general-equilibrium approach allows 
us to detect the outcome of decentralized decision making in a complete market where traders 
take optimal hedging decisions and where the prices of these hedge instruments are set in 
equilibrium. The second set of results obtained by partial equilibrium models is that a higher 
exchange risk is always associated with a higher probability that deviations from Commodity 
Price Parity will be sufficiently large to generate trade. This view takes the demand curve as Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  27 
given, and ignores the issue about the source of the higher exchange risk. We have shown 
that the shifts in the demand curves caused by changing endowments of other goods are 
likely to obscure, or possibly even dominate, the effects that would be observed in a one-
good or partial-equilibrium model. 
From a policymaker's perspective, our model implies that the volatility of the real 
exchange rate can be reduced by (a)  reducing the volatility of fundamentals  and (b)  by 
reducing the barriers to  trade. However, these two measure may have different effects on 
trade: while a reduction in trade barriers is associated with an increase in the volume of trade, 
a reduction in the volatility of fundamentals may be associated with a reduction in trade. That 
is, even though both measures enhance welfare, they may have opposite effects on the 
endogenous variable, trade. This means that, in a model with risk, that one cannot simply 
look at expected trade to draw conclusions about welfare. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade 
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and the Real Exchange Rate 
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This appendix contains the proofs of the propositions that relate to the amount of trade and 
the  exchange rate. The proofs for Propositions 2.2 and 3.3,  which are more related to 
statistics than economics,  are given in Appendix B. 
Proof  of  Proposition 1.1 
Given that the utility function in (2) is time-separable, and the constraints in (3) apply period-
by-period, we can rewrite the intertemporal problem of the central planner as  a  static 
optimization program. Thus, the central planner's problem at time tis: 
(AI) 
subject to the constraints in (3). Letting A(t) denote the Lagrangian function and "'kjCt)  the 
Lagrangian multipliers on the consumption of goodj in country k, we get the following first-
order conditions: 
dA(t)  . 
0= Xk/t) dXk/t) ,J=l, 2, 3 and k=l, 2; 
o  > dA(t)  _  A ./)  A2i(t)  Ali(t)  > _1_  '=1  2  3' 
- dXkjo(t)  - - l)\t  +  =>  - ,J",  1  +!j  A2jCt)  1  +! 
o  ~ dA(t)  =  -A2(t) + Ali(t)  =>  A2i(t)  ;:::  _1_  , j=l, 2, 3 . 
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Substituting the appropriate value for 'tj {j = 1,2,3}, we infer that for the non-tradable good 
(j =  1,  'ti =  00)  it is optimal not to correct any difference in the ratio of marginal utility of 
consumption of this good across countries (that is, this good is never traded). Thus: 
(A2) 
which is the expression in (4). In contrast, because 't3 = 0, the first-order conditions imply 
that it is optimal to trade good 3 so as to equalize the marginal utilities of consumption of this 
good across countries: 
(A3) 
This implies the following optimal consumption ratio for good 3: 
1 
(A4) 
Lastly, for good 2 that can be traded only at a cost (0 < 't2 < 00),  the first order conditions 
yield the following bounds on relative marginal utility: 
implying that it is optimal to  trade this good only when these bounds are violated in the 
absence of trade. After substituting (A2) and (A4) into (AS) and rearranging, we obtain the 
following bounds on the relative consumption of good 2: 
(A6) Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade 
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where K:i(t)  and  ~(t) are as defined in (5). To obtain the bounds for good 3 expressed in 
terms of output ratios, as in (6), substitute into (A4) the appropriate expression for C22(t)  and 
C12(t) in (5). 
Proof  of  Proposition 1.2 
From (A2), it is never optimal to trade good one; this yields the result in (9). To obtain 
equations (10)-(13), note that the relevant state space can be divided into three distinct 
regions: a) where good 2 is not traded (state i =  0); b) where good 2 is exported by country 1 
(state i =  1); and c) where good 2 is exported by country 2 (state i =  2). 
a. No trade in good 2. In the absence of trade in sector 2, we have  ~~~~g  =  ~~~~g, implying 
that 
X12(t) = X22(t) = O.  (A6) 
To compute the exports for the third good, note that the consumption ratio for the 
perfectly tradable good in this state is given by ~(t), defined in (6). The volume of trade for 
good 3 can be identified from the sharing rule C23(t) =  ~(t) c 13(t) and the market clearing 
condition C13(t) =  q13(t) -X13(t) + X23(t) and C23(t) =  q23(t) -X23(t) + X13(t). The solution is: 
(t)  (t)  K:~(t) q13(t) - q23(t) 
X13  -X23  = 
1 + ~(t) 
(A7) 
Note that X13(t)  and X23(t)  are constrained to be positive, which implies that if K:~(t) q13(t) -
q23(t) > 0, then X23(t) is zero in (A 7); otherwise, X13(t) is zero. 
b. Exports of  good 2 from country 1. From (5), in state i = 1, country 1 must be exporting an 
amount X  12(t) of good 2 such that C22(t)!c12(t)) =  (1 +t2r<X  (82181)<X  (K:l(t) )~. The amount 
of good 2 being exported from country 1 can be identified from the sharing rule C22(t) = K:1(t) 
C12(t)  (with K:!(t) defined in (5)) and the market clearing condition C12(t) =  q12(t) - X12(t)  and 
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(AS) 
which is positive since we are considering states where q12(t)  ~(t) > q22(t), implying that 
X22(t)  = O.  The optimal consumption ratio for good 3 in state 1 is  ~(t), given in (6). By a 
similar argument as before, we identify the amount of trade in the perfectly tradable good: 
x  (t) -x  (t) = K1(t) q13(t) -q23(t) 
13  23  1  I()  + K3  t 
(A9) 
where X13(t)  and X23(t)  can be determined by imposing the non-negativity constraint on the 
export quantities. 
c. Exports of  good 2 from country 2. In this state, country 2 must be exporting an amount 
X22(t)  such that C22(t)!c12(t)  = (1 +t2ta  (82f81)a  (KI(t) )~. Imposing the market clearing 
condition, the volume of trade in good 2 is: 
(A  10) 
which is positive since we are considering states where q22(t)  ~(t) > q12(t) implying that 
X12(t) =  O.  Finally, the optimal consumption ratio for good 3 is given by Kj-(t),  and using the 
same arguments as above, allows us to obtain: 
(All) 
where x 13(t)  and X23(t)  can be identified by imposing the non-negativity constrain on the 
export quantities. Collecting the results in (A6) and (AS) gives (10), and the results in (A6) 
and (A1O) give (11). Collecting the results in (A7), (A9) and (All) yields (12) and (13). Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  32 
Proof of  Proposition 1.3 
Let Z(t) denote the nominal exchange rate. Then, the relative price of a good across countries 
is given by the marginal rate  of substitution, in the central planner's utility function,  of 
consumption of that good abroad versus at home: 
Z(t) P2i(t) 
P1j(t) 
=  82 aU2(t)/dC2j(t) 
8IaUI(t)/aqjCt) 
(AI2) 
We can relate the right-hand-side to the indirect utility function, V(m!&),Pk(t», defined as 
where mk(t) is nominal spending, P  k(t) is the vector of prices (of goods j, U= I, 2, 3}), and 
Ak(t) =  aV(mk(t), Pk(t»/amk(t) is the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country 
k.  The first order condition of this optimization problem is aUk(Ck(t»(dckjCt) =  Ak(t) PkjCt). 
Substituting this condition into (AI2) and rearranging, we obtain 
82au2(C2(t»  I aC2j(t) 
Z(t) =  P2i(t) 





8laV(mi  (t), PI(t» 
a ml(t) 
(AI4) 
Thus, the nominal exchange rate is the ratio of the marginal indirect utilities of nominal 
spending abroad versus at home. 
If  the utility function is homothetic, Uk(ckCt))  can be written as <I>[Uk(q(t»], where 
Uk(C!&»  is a linear homogenous function of the consumption amounts of the individual goods 
and <I>  is an order-preserving transformation. Thus, if Uk(q(t»  is maximized subject to the 
budget constraint, also Uk(Ck(t»  must be at its maximum subject to the budget constraint. 
Denote the solution to that last problem as vk(mk(t), pkCt»: 
N 
v(mk(t), Pk(t»  ==  Max  {Vk(Ck(t»  - AkCt) [ I,  Ckj(t) Pklt) - mk(t)] .  (AI5) 
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It  is well known-see, for instance, Samuelson and Swamy (1974))-that the multiplier Ak(t) 
in (A15) is of the form Ak(f) = 1IIIk(Pk(t)), with II a linear homogenous function of the prices 
Pk/t) and independent of the nominal consumption budget, mk(t). In addition, the indirect 
utility functions are related as follows: 
(A16) 
As Ih(Pk(t)) is linear homogenous in the prices of individual goods, it can be interpreted as 
the price level, and Vk(t)  = mk(t)lIIk(Pk(t) can be interpreted as the indicator of (total) real 
consumption. Using the chain-rule to differentiate (A16), we can re-express the marginal 
utilities of nominal spending, that appear on the right hand side of (A14), to  the marginal 
utility of real total consumption, d<l>(Vk(t))/dvk(t), divided by the price level. Substituting this 
into (A14), yields: 
Z(t) = 82  d<l>2(t)/dv2(t)  III  (t) 
81  d<l>l (t)/dVI (t)  Il2(t) 
(A  17) 
(?  EO)  For our utility function, real consumption is given by Ck(t) =  V~1  (CkJ<t)):J  . It  follows that 
Set) = Z(t) Il2(t)  = 82  (fr (C2;(t))EjJll  . 
II  I  (t)  81  V=l  Clj(t) 
(A18) 
Upon substituting the optimum consumption ratio for each good, given in equations (4), (5) 
and (6), we obtain (14). 
Proof  of  Proposition 2.1 
The results follow from the convexity of the functions (16), (17), (18) and (19) in qI2(T) and 
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Proof  of  Corollary 2.1 
We consider foreign exports X22(T) as given in (17), and rewrite Max[Q22(T) - Kf Q21(T), 0] 
as Q22(T) - Kf Q21 (T) times an indicator function: 
o otherwise 
Thus, the expectation to be evaluated can be written as 
(A19) 
To solve the expectations in the above expression, we use the following result: 
Lemma: Let X and Y (where Y may be a vector) be joint lognormal with means of  the log-
transforms denoted by mx and my, variances of  the log-transforms denoted by Vx and Vy, and 
covariance between the log-transforms denoted by cxy.  Let feY)  be a function of Y.  Then, 
provided the expectation exists, 
E(Xf(Y); mx, my, V X, vy, CxY =  E(X;  mx, vx)  E(f(Y); my + cxy, Vy).  (A20) 
That is,  in E(f(Y) ; my + cxy,  Vy)  the mean(s) of InY has (have) been shifted by adding the 
covariance of  lnY with InX. 
Proof: Please see Beckers and Sercu (1987). 
We apply Lemma 1 to each term in the expectation of equation (A19), choosing the 
corresponding tradable good output as  the X  -variable, and the indicator I(q22&i)  as  the 
q21 
function f(Y).  Noting that the  expectation of this indicator function is  a probability, the Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  35 
expected volume of foreign exports can be written as the difference of the two expected 
values, each of them multiplied by a cumulative normal probability, Edl~~~~g)} = N(d), 
evaluated on the basis of an appropriately shifted distribution function: 
where N(d) is the cumulative standard normal probability (prob (z  ~ d)). To obtain the 
argument for the (shifted) normal probability function, we rewrite the shifted mean in the 
first expectation on the left-hand side of the above expression as follows: 
E{ln q22(T))+ cov (In q22(l)  In q22(T)) 
q22(T)  t  'q22(T) 
= [lnq22(t) + (J.!22 -k  0'222) (T  -t)] - [lnq21 (t) + (J.!21 - k  0'212) (T  -t)] 
+ [0'222 - P2 0"21  0"22]  (T  -t) 
= [In q22(t) + 1122 (T  -t)] - [In q21 (t) + 1121 (T  -t)] +  ~  [0"212 - 2 P2 0"21  0"22  + 0"222] (T-t) 
= In Et[q22(t)] + 1  «1>2 (T  -t) 
Et[q21 (t)]  2 
where  «1>2  ==  0'212 - 2 P2 0'12 0'22 + 0'222 is the variance of the log output ratio. Thus, the 
probability associated with Et(q22(t)) can be worked out as 
= N(d1) ,  (A21) 
Analogously, the shifted mean in the second expectation in equation (A19) can be 
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E (In q22(T))+ cov (In q21(T)  In q22(T))=  In Et[q22(t)] + 1. <j>2(T -t)  (A22) 
t,  q22(T)  t  'q22(T)  Et[q21 (t)]  2  ' 
implying that the associated probability is 
(A23) 
where 
Using the Lemma, and (A2l) and (A23), we obtain 
(A24) 
which is equation (25). We can rewrite the numerator of the right hand side of (A24) as 
The part in the curly brackets is formally identical to  the valuation formula of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) for a call option on an asset with current price ~1~~~~g~ , 
strike price K!, a zero interest rate and variance <j>2 p.a. Because option prices increase, ceteris 
paribus, when the variance increases, the expression in square brackets is a positive function 
Proof of  Proposition 2.3 
This follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  37 
Proof  of  Proposition 3.1 
Conditional on the output in the non-traded goods sector, the relation between riskiness of 
output in the  imperfectly traded  goods  sector and trade  is positive,  as  established in 
Proposition 2.1. Similarly, conditional on the output in the non-traded goods sector, the 
relation between riskiness of output in the imperfectly traded goods sector and the volatility 
of the exchange rate is also positive, as established in Proposition 2.2. Given that these 
results are true for all levels of output in the non-traded goods sector, they are also true 
unconditionally. 
Proof of  Proposition 3.2 
To prove the claim that the volume of trade may not be increasing in the volatility of the non-
traded good (good 1), it is sufficient to show that exports may be non-convex in the ratio of 
the output of good 1 across the two countries, lq(t) ==  q21(t)lq11(t). That is, we show that, for 
some parameter values, 
From (10), we can re-write the expression for exports in the case where they are positive as: 
(A25) 
Thus, the volume of exports depends on the output of good 1 only through the effect on K1(t). 
From (5), 
a 2  K~(t) 
a  [Kl(t)]2 
=  ~  K~(t), 
Kl(t) 
(A26) 
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where  ~  =  q(1-11)  .  Then,  differentiating  (A25),  and simplifying the resulting 
1-(1-£  1)(1-11) 
expression gives: 
a  X12(t) 
a  lq(t) 
a  K1(t)  (1 +'t2) [q21 (t) + (1  + 't2) q22(t)] 
=  aKl(t) x  [K!(t) (1+'t2) + 1]2  . 
Differentiating one more time, and collecting terms we get: 
(1+'t2) [q21(t) + (1 + 't2) q22(t)] 
[K!(t) (1 +'t2) + 1]3 
Thus, the sign of (A28) depends on the expression in curly brackets. To show that this may 
be negative, substitute from (5), (A26) and (A27), and simplify to get: 
where ~ =  £1(1-11)  . Consider the case where 0 <  11  < 1, and thus, 0 < ~ < 1. The sign 
1-(1-£1)(1-11) 
of (A29) then depends on the terms in the curly brackets (on the second line)-but the first 
term in curly brackets is negative and the second one is positive. Thus, the difference of the 
two terms in curly brackets is always negative for the case 0 <  11  < 1. 
Proof of  Proposition 4.1 
The direct relation between trade in good 3 and riskiness of output in sector 3 follows from 
the convexity of the expressions for exports and imports in (12) and (13). The fact that 
overall trade also increases follows from (10) and (11),  where we see that trade in the Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  39 
imperfectly-tradable good is not affected by the output in sector 3. Finally, the fact that there 
is no effect of riskiness in sector 3 on the exchfulge rate can be seen from the expression for 
the exchange rate in (14), which is independent of output in sector 3. 
Proof  of  Proposition 4.2 
Given that a perfectly tradable good does not affect either trade or the exchange rate (as 
explained in the proof for Proposition 4.1), the effect of an increase in riskiness in sector 2 on 
trade in good 2 and exchange rate volatility can be deduced from the results in Propositions 
3.2 and 3.3. To show that the effect of an increase in riskiness in sector 2 on trade in good 3 
is ambiguous, use the same approach as that in the proof for Proposition 3.2. 
Proof of  Proposition 4.3 
The fact that trade in good 3 is not always an increasing function of the riskiness of output in 
sector 2 can be established using the same arguments as in the proof for Proposition 3.2. That 
a higher risk in the relative output of sector 2 still increases exchange risk and expected trade 
in good 2, follows from the arguments used in the proofs for Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  40 
AppendixB: The Variance ofa Truncated Variable 
Proof of  Proposition 2.2 
Let xCT) be a random variable and let yCT) =  YCxCT),  U, L) be equal to xCT) truncated at U and 
L, as follows: 19 
{
L'  xCT) <L; 
yCT) =  Y(x(D, U, L)  ==  xCT),  L::; x(T) ::; U; 
U,  xCT) > U  . 
(Bl) 
This  is  the  model  for  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  one-good case,  where xCT)  = 
In[Q22(T)/Q12CT)], L = ln~, and U =  In~. We need to compare the variance of the truncated 
variable y(T) =  Y(x(T), U, L) to the variance of  y'(1) =  Y(x'(T), U, L) where x'(1) =  x(T) + e(T) 
, E(e(D I x(T)) =  O.  Thus, x'(T) is more risky than x(T) in the sense of Rothschild and 
Stiglitz(1970). Initially, we restrict eCT) to be a binomial variable, 
{
+8,  prob 0.5 
e(T) = 
---8,  prob 0.5 
CB2) 
Note that the results obtained from the binomial case are quite general. For example, by 
repeating our analysis for a new increase in risk, x"(T) =  x'(T) ± 8, and taking limits for many 
such increases in risk, the conclusions also hold for normally distributed eCT).  Moreover, 
subsequent changes in riskiness need not always be of the same step size, 8.  Thus, the 
conclusions also hold for mixtures of normals or any other distribution that can be generated 
by  a  binomial  model.  Finally,  xCT)  itself may  have  any  distribution  and may  be  a 
transformation (for example, a log) of another variable. 
19 Although x(t) may have infinite variance, yet) must have a finite variance because of the truncation. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  41 
To investigate the effect of a perturbation of x (I) on var(y(T)), we write var(y(T)) as 
E(Y(1)2) - [E(y(1))]2. Consider the limit of the change in ErJ(y'(T))]  for8~O, 
lim E[f(y'(T))] - E[f(y(T))] 
8~O  82 
(B3) 
This limit tells us how a small increase in riskiness affects the expectation of some function 
of y(T). Note also that, if  x(T) has a finite (conditional) variance, (B2) implies that var(x'(T)) 
- var(x(T)) =  var(e(T)) =  82. Thus, if x(T) (and, by implication, x'(T)) has finite variance, we 
can interpret this limit as the derivative of the expectation of a function of yeT) with respect 
to the variance of X(T), with the proviso that the change in this variance must result from an 
increase of Rothschild-Stiglitz riskiness. The function f(y(T)) we are interested in is the 
variance of the truncated variance y(T). We start the proof by first stating a technical result. 
Lemma 1: For yeT) with any given distribution: 
lim var(y'(T)) -var(y(T)) = <I>(U) - <I>(L) -u  ~(U) + L  ~(L) + E(y(T))  [~(U)  -~(L)]  (B4) 
8~O  82 
Proof: Using var(y'(1)) =  E(y'(1)2) - [E(y'(T))]2, we can write the left-hand-side as: 
lim var(y'(T)) - var(y(T)) = lim E(Y'(1)2) - E(y(1)2)  2 E(y(I)) lim E(y'(T)) - E(y(T))  CB5) 
8~O  82  8~O  82  8~O  82 
We first examine the second term on the right-hand side and then the fIrst. 
Note that the effect on yeT) of the perturbation of  x(T) is the same as adding the error 
to y(T) and subtracting it from the bounds U and L. 
y'(I)  ==  Y(x(T) + e(T),L, U) =  e(T) + Y(x(T) ,L-e(T), U-e(T)) .  (B6) 
Thus, (B6) implies that the effect of increased riskiness on the expectation of the truncated 
variable equals the expected effect of the perturbation of the bounds: Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  42 
E(y'(T)) - E(y(T)) = E[Y(x(T) ,£-e(T), U-e(T)) - Y(x(T),L, U)] .  (B7) 
If, in addition, e(T) is binomial, we can further specify the effect of the randomized bounds as 
E[Y(x(T), L+8, U+8)] + E[Y(x(T),L---a, U---a)]  _  E(y(T)) 
E(y'(T)) - E(y(T))  _  2  ,  (B8) 
82  82 
which is the usual finite-difference approximation for a second derivative. Taking limits as 
8 ---+ 0, and applying l'Hopital's rule twice, we obtain the regular second derivatives: 
I,  E(y'(T)) - E(y(T)) _1.[a2 E[Y(x(T), L, U)]  a2 E[Y(x(T), L, U)]] 
~  82  - 2  a L2  +  a u 2  .  (B9) 
To evaluate the second derivatives in (B9), note that the expectation of the truncated 
variable can be written as 
E(y(T)) = L <1>(L)  + f  x d<1>(x)  +  U [l-<1>(U)] , 
L 
(BlO) 
where <1>(x) is the (cumulative) distribution function,  ~(x) is the density function, and d<1>(x) = 
~(x). From (BlO), we obtain 
a Ea(yiT)) + a  ~(yJT)) = [L ~(L) + <1>(L)]  + [-L ~(L) + U ~(U)] + [-U  <I>(U) + 1-<1>(U)] 
=  <1>(L)  + [1 - <1>(U)]  ,  (Bll) 
and, therefore, we get a reduced-form for the second part of the expression in (B 10), 
lim E(y'(T)) - E(y(T)) =  1. [a2E(Y(n) + a2E(Y(n)] = 1.  [<I>(L) - <I>(U)]  .  (B12) 
hO  82  2  a L2  a u2  2 
We  next  identify  the  effect of the perturbation  on E(y(T)2),  From  (B 12),  we 
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E(Y'(1)2) - E(y(1)2) = 82 + 2 E[e(T) Y(x(T), L-e(T), U-e(T»] 
+ E{ [Y(x(T), L-e(1), U-e(T»]2 - U}  ]2) .  (B13) 
Again using l'Hopital's rule, we can identify the limits for the expectations on the right hand 
side. For the first expectation, we have 
lim E[e(T) Y(x(T), L-e(T), U-e(T»] = lim 8 E[Y(x(T), L-f), U-f)] + (-8) E[Y(x(T), L+8, U+8)] 
o~O  82  o~O  282 
Dividing numerator and denominator by 8, and adding and subtracting E[Y(x(T), L, U)] in the 
numerator, this can be rewritten as 
lim E[e(1) Y(x(T), £-e(T), U-e(T»] =  _  [a EN.T»  + a  ~(yJ1)J = [<1>(U)  ~  1] ~  <1>(L).  (B14) 
o~o  82 
Similarly, the limit for the second expectation on the right hand side of (B13) is 
1 .  E{  [Y(x(T), £-e(T), U-e(T»]2 } - E{ [Y(x(1), L, U)]2} 
1m 
o~O  82 
=  <I>(L) +  L <1>(L) + [1--<1>(U)] - U <1>(U)  .  (B15) 
Combining (B13), (B14) and (B15), we can conclude that 
lim E(Y'(1)2) - E(y(T)2)  = 1 + 2 [<1>(V) - 1 -<1>(L)] + <I>(L) + L <1>(L) + [1--<1>(U)]  - U <1>(V) 
HO  82 
=  <I>(U) - <I>(L) - U <1>(U) + L <1>(L)  .  (B16) 
Finally, we substitute (B12) and (B16) into (B14) to get the result in (B4). n Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  44 
Proof of Part 1 of Proposition 2.2: For the case of normal distributions, (B4) can be written 
as20 
a  var(y(1)) =  N(u) _ N(l) - U n(u) +  L <»(1) + E(y(T)) [n(u) - n(l)] , 
a  a2 
(BI7) 
U - E(.x(T))  L - E(x(T)) 
where, u =  ; I =  ; n(z) is the standard normal density; and, N(z) the 
a  a 
standard normal probability.21 Note that the terms in (BI7) can be linked to the partial mean 
and the partial mean square of x(T) - E(x(1)) betweenL and U. Specifically,22 
and23 
U  u  1  [x - E(x(1))] <»(.x) dx  = Ja z n(z) dz  = -a  n(z) 17  = a  [n(l) - n(u)] . 
u 
U  2  J  2  2  1  [x - E(x(T))]  <»(x) dx) =  0- z  n(z) dz 
u 
= ~  f  z [z n(z) dz] 
I 
u 
= ~  [-z n(z)] 1  ~ - ~  f[-n(z)] dz 
I 
(BIg) 
20 A direct derivation, starting from the normal distribution and not using the concept of "increased riskiness," is 
available on request. 
21We immediately conclude that when u and I are many standard deviations away from  zero, then (B14) 
approaches zero because N(u), N(l), n(u) and <t>(l)  approach zero. That is, when trade is a near-certainty, the 
variance of the real exchange rate is hardy affected when the variance of the underlying variable changes. This 
conclusion also holds for any non-normal distribution as long as the density approaches zero when x(t) ~  ± 00 
and the mean of x is finite. 
.  2 
22Do the substitution V= -~ . Thenz dz= -dv, andze-z2/2 dz =-eV dv. So the integral of {z exp[-z2/2]} is--ev 
=_ e-z2/2. 
23Integrate by parts, using z2  n(z) dz = u dv  where u = z and dv = z n(z) dz, implying du = dz and, from  the 
previous footnote, v = -n(z). Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  45 
cr- £,  ------>--"-'--'-- n(u)  - (j  [N(T) -N(u)]  __  2[L-Y n(l\- U-E(x(D)  ]  2 
(j  (j 
= (j [(L - E(x(D»  neT) - (U - E(x(T)) n(u) ] 
Thus, using (B 18) and (B 19), (B 17) can be simplified to 
u  u 
a  vart(y(T)  =  f  (x - E(x(T))2 ~(x) dx  - 2 E[y(T) - E(x(T)]  f(x - E(x(T)) ~(x) dx 
a~  L  L 
u 
= J  {(x - E(x(D»2 - E[y(T) - E(x(D)] (x - E(x(T))}  ~(x) dx 
L 
u 
=  f  {(x - E(x(n» [x - E(x(D) - E(y(T)  - E(x(T)]}  ~(x) dx 
L 
u 
=  f  (x - E(x(T)) [x - E(y(T)]  ~(x) dx. 
L 








where  N(U~~~(b) is the density function conditional on L  ~  x(D ~ U. Define EcCx(T)  as the 
conditional mean of x given that L  ~x(T) ~  U. The integrand in (B21) can then be rewritten 
as 
(x - E(x(T)) [x - E(y(D)] 
=  (x - Ec<x(T)  + Ec(x(T)  - E(x(n»  [x - Ec(x(T)  + Ec(x(T)  - E(y(T)] Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  46 
= (x - Edx(T))2 + (x - Ec(x(T)) [Ec(x(T)  - E(x(T)]  (B22) 
+ (EcCx(T)  - E(x(T)) (x - Ec(x(T)) + (EcCx(T)  - E(x(T)) [Ec(x(T)  - E(y(T)]. 
Substituting (B22) into (B21), and noting that the conditional expectation of (x - Ec(x(T)) is 
zero, we obtain 
u 
J  ~W 




2  ~(x) 
=  { (x - Ec(x(T))  N(u)-N(b) dx  +  (Ec(x(T)  - E(x(T)) [Ec(x(T)  - E[y(T)].  (B23) 
L 
The first tenn on the RHS of (B23), the variance of x conditional on U ~  x  ~  L, is strictly 
positive. The second tenn is zero when Ec(x(T)  = E(x(T), that is, when the no-trade domain 
[L , U] is symmetric around the expected value of x. The second tenn becomes positive when 
the no-trade zone [L , U] is more towards one of the tails of the distribution of x, rather than 
right at the center. To see this, note that, from (B23), E[y(T)] is a weighted average of L, 
Ec(x(T), and U, with weights N(b), N(u)-N(b), and 1 - N(u), respectively. If  the no-trade 
zone is in the right tail of the distribution, we have EcCx(T)  - E(x(T)  > 0, as EcCx(T)  is to 
the right of E(x(T). But EcCx(T)  is also to the right of E[y(T)]: Efy(T)] is a weighted average 
of  L , EcCx(T), and U, and the weight of L, N(b), is much larger than the weight of U, which 
is I-N(u). Thus, when the no-trade zone is in the right tail of the distribution of y, then 
Ec(x(T)  is to the right of both E(x(T)  and E[y(T)]. By a similar argument, EcCx(T)  is to the 
left of both E(x(T)  and E(y(T)  when the no-trade zone is in the left tail of the distribution of 
y. This means that the second tenn on the RHS of (B21), being a product of two factors with 
the same sign, is positive. Thus, (B21) is positive. Since the sign of (B23) is the sign of 
(B21), the variance of the exchange rate is a positive function of cr. n Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  47 
Proof of Part 2 of Proposition 2.2: 
To show that for a general unimodal distribution, expression (B4) is always positive when L 
and U contain the mode of the distribution of  x(T) (l/J(L) < cfJ(E(y(T)) < l/J(U)), rearrange (B4) 
as: 
lim var(y'(T)) - var(y(T)2)  =  [<1>(U) - <1>(L)] - [U - E(y(T))] <I>(U) - [E(y(T)) -L]  <I>(L). (B24) 
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Equation (B24) describes the surface under the density function between L and U, minus the 
surface of the rectangles labeled a and b in Figure B.l. When <I>(L)  < <I>(E(y(T)) < <I>(U), the 





L  E(y)  U  x 
In (B4), the term [<l>(U) - <l>(L)]  corresponds to the surface below the distribution function between Land U. 
The  term  [U - E(y(T)] cj>(U)  corresponds to  the surface of the rectangle b, while [E(y(T)  - L] cj> (L) 
corresponds to  the surface of the rectangle b. When the mode of the distribution is between U  and L, the 
remaining area has a positive surface. 
Proof of Part 3 of Proposition 2.2: 
We now show that if the no-trade domain [L, U] is in a concave part of the distribution, 
expression (B4) is always positive. Suppose that <I>(U)  > <I>(L)-we are in the left tail of a 
unimodal distribution. Define 
24Note that is  result holds whether or not there are convex sections in  the distribution function within the 
domain [L, U]. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  48 
u 
Z  ==  f x  ~(x)  dx 
L  <I>(U) - <I>(L) 
which is the mean of x conditional on there being no trade. Since we are in the left tail, Z > 
U  ;L, because there is more density to the right than to the left. It  follows that 
E(y(1))  > L <I>(L) + (<I>(U) - <I>(L)) U;L + U[1 - <I>(U)]  = U - [<I>(U) + <I>(L)] U 2  L , 
and, therefore, from (B24), 
1.  var(y'(1)) - var(y(1)2) 
1m 
o~O  02 
> <I>(U) - <I>(L) - U  ~(U) + L  ~(L) + {u -[<I>(U) + <I>(L)]  U 2L} [~(U) - ~(L)] 
= <I>(U) - <I>(L) -~(L) (U -L)  - [<I>(U) + <I>(L)]  U 2L  [~(U) - ~(L)]  (B25) 
Since we are in the left tail, we have 1-<I>(U) > <I>(L) and, therefore, <I>(U) + <I>(L) < 1. Thus, 
lim var(y'(1))-var(y(1)2)  >  <I>(U)-<I>(L)-~(L)(U-L)- U2-L[~(U)-~(L)]  (B26) 
o~O  02 
= <I>(U) -<I>(L)  - U 2L  [~(U) + ~(L)] .  (B27) 
This last expression corresponds to the area below ~(x) between U and L, minus the surface 
of the tetrahedron abed shown in Figure B.2. If ~(x) is concave, the remaining surface is 
positive. Thus, for concave ~(x), the variance of y(I') increases with riskiness. Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  49 
Figure B.2. 
(x) 
L  u 
Graphically, the derivative of the variance of the truncated variable w.r.t. the riskiness is at larger than the area 
below <I>(x)  between U  and L, minus the surface of the tetrahedron abed. If  <I>(x)  is concave, the remaining 
surface is positive. 
We lastly show that if the no-trade domain  [L,  U] is in a sufficiently convex part of the 
distribution, expression (B4) may become negative. Suppose there is a strong convexity 
between Land U, as in Figure B.3. Then E(z(D) approximately equals <1>(L)  (U + L)/2, and 
(B27) actually provides·a good approximation: 
1.  var(y'(D) - var(Y(D2) 
1m 
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:> <I>(U) - <I>(L) - <1>(L) (U -L) - [<I>(U) + <I>(L)] U :;L  [<1>(U).- <1>(L)]  .  (B28) 
However, with such a strong convexity, <I>(U) - <I>(L)  approximately equals <1>(L)  (U - L). 
Substitution of this then produces a negative value: 
lim var(y'(D) - var(Y(D2)  :>  _  [<I>(U) + <I>(L)] U2 - L [<1>(U) - <1>(L)] < 0 .  (B29) 
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Figure B.3. 
a  b 
L  E(z)  u 
With a very strong convexity, subtraction of the rectangles a and b from the area under the distribution function 
between U and L leaves a negative area. Thus, increased riskiness decreases the variance of the truncated 
variable. 
Proof  of  Proposition 3.3 
Define yeT) = In[e2le  1] -lnS(T) , z(I')  = el Inq21 (T)  , and x(T) = In q22(T). Proposition 1.3 
11  e2  e2  qll  (T)  q12(T) 
then implies that the exchange rate can be expressed as: 
{
L(Z(I')  ,x(T) < L(z(T)  ; 
yeT) = z(I') + Y(x(T),L(z(T), U(z(T)) =  z(T) +  x(T)  ,  L(z(I')  ~  x(T)  ~  U(z(I')  ; 
U(z(I')  ,  x(T)  ~  U(z(T)  . 
(B30) 
We now want to investigate the effect on the variance of yeT) when the riskiness of 
z(T) is increased. Thus, we perturb z(I') into z*(I') =  z(I') + e*(T) where e*(T) has mean zero 
and is independent of both z(T) andx(T). For e*(T) small, the effect on U(z(T)  and L(z(T)  is 
dU(z(I')  =  aU(z(T»  e*(T)  =  e2  el (1-Tl)  e*(T) =  e2 (1-11)  e*(T) ,  (B31) 
az(T)  el 1 - e2(1-11)  1 - e2(1-11) 
dL(z(I')  = dU(z(T)  .  (B32) Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  51 
We immediately infer that if 11=1,  then U(z(T))  and L(z(T)) are unaffected. Thus, 
when 11  = 1, we have y*(T) =  y(T) + e*(T), which means that the variance of yeT) increases 
when z(T) becomes more risky. To analyze the cases where 11#1, we define e(T) = -k* e*(T) 
where k* =  E2 (1-11)  ,and we let e(T) take on the values +8 or ---() with equal probabilities. 
1 - E2(1-11) 
Then 
y*(T)  ==  z(1) + e*(T) + Y[x(T), U(z(T)) + k* e*(1), L(z(1)) + k* e*(T)] 
= z(1) - (1 + ;*  )e(T) +  [e(T) + Y(x(T)  , L(z(1)) - e(T), U(z(1)) - e(T))] 
= z(1) - k e(T)  + y'(T) .  (B33) 
where k  =  (1  + l/k*) =  1  and y'(T) = Y(x(T)  + e(T), L(z(1)), U(z(T))), as in the 
E2 (1-11) 
preceding sections. Although L(z(T)) and U(z(T)) are now random, we can still use the results 
of the preceding analysis to obtain results conditional on z, and then take expectations. One 
immediate implication of (B33) is that E(y*(T) - y(T)) =  E(y'(T) - y(T)). Thus, from (B 12), 
lim  E(y*(T) -y(T)) = .1  E[<I>(L(z(T))) -<I>(U(z(T)))] . 
0-70  82  2 
(B34) 
Noting that z(T) is independent of  e(T) and, by implication, also from (y'(T) - y(T))  , equation 
(B33) implies that 
lim  E[Y*(T)2 - y(T)2]  = k2 + lim  E[y'(T)2 - y(T)2]  _  lim  2k E[e(T) y'(T)] 
0-70  82  0-70  82  0-70  82  ' 
or, using (B16) and (B14), 
lim  E[Y*(T)2 - y(T)2]  = k2 + E[<I>(U(z(T))) -<I>(L(z(T))) 
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- U(z(T)) cj>(U(z(T))) +  L(z(T)) cj>(L(z(T)))]  - 2k E[<I>(U(z(T))) - 1 - <I>(L(z(T)))].  (B35) Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  52 
It then follows that 
lim  var(Y*(n); var(Y(n)  :=  E[<1>(U(z(1))) - <1>(L(z(T))) - U(z(T)) <I>(U(z(T))) 
0---+0  0 
+ k2  + 2k E[1-<1>(U(z(T)) + <1>(L(z(T))]  (B36) 
Comparing (B36) to (B28) we see that the effect of the increased riskiness of zen equals the 
expected effect of an increased riskiness of x(T), plus a term k2 + 2k E[l - <1>(U(z(T)) + 
<1>(L(z(T))]. When k is positive, that is, when 11  < 1, the additional term is always positive 
because [1 - <1>(U(z(n»  + <1>(L(z(T))], being the probability of trade, is always nonnegative. 
Thus, when 11  <1, the relation between riskiness of output in the non-traded goods sector and 
the volatility of the exchange rate is positive. We have already discussed the case 11=1, and 
found that also in this case the effect of increasing the riskiness of zen on the variance of  y is 
positive. However, when 11  > 1, k ==  1/[£2 (1-11)] is negative. Then k2 + 2k [1 - <1>(U(z(T)) + 
<1>(L(z(T))] is positive only if k is more negative than -2[1 - <1>(U(z(n»  + <1>(L(z(n»], which 
obviously is not always the case. Thus, in this case, the relation between riskiness in the 
output of the non-traded goods sector and exchange rate volatility depends on the magnitude 
of  11  and £2. n Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade  53 
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